TEHRAN – As tensions across West Asia escalate once again, the prospect of regional stability hangs by a thread. Repeated failures of Western peace initiatives have driven states to seek new partners. 

With Washington’s support overwhelmingly focused on Israel, many in the region now feel compelled to look elsewhere. Increasingly, they ask whether their investments in U.S. cooperation will hold firm in a crisis, or if Washington will continue to favor one ally at the expense of others. 

June’s U.S.–Israeli strikes on key Iranian nuclear sites, now combined with the European Troika’s move to reactivate UN “snapback” sanctions, have underscored how swiftly Western powers can wield diplomatic and military pressure with little room for recourse. Confronted with this reality, Iran is likely to deepen its security, economic, and diplomatic ties with Russia and China. 

Washington’s alignment with Israeli priorities—particularly on nuclear enrichment—will only accelerate Tehran’s eastward shift. After more than two decades of insisting on its right to enrich uranium under sanctions, the issue only saw progress once the U.S. acknowledged that right as a basis for negotiation. Iran has been signaling its readiness to negotiate a fair deal—albeit with more stringent terms than the 2015 JCPOA—a position the Iranian foreign minister recently articulated in an op-ed for The Guardian:

“Iran remains open to diplomacy. It is ready to forge a realistic and lasting bargain that entails ironclad oversight and curbs on enrichment in exchange for the termination of sanctions. Failing to seize on this fleeting window of opportunity may have consequences destructive for the region and beyond on a whole new level,” Abbas Araghchi wrote.

Iran’s latest agreement with the IAEA—establishing new terms of cooperation—appeared to be designed to delay or extend the activation of UN Security Council sanctions and offered one of the few remaining paths toward reviving a nuclear accord. If those sanctions take effect in the coming months, the consequences could unfold on both short- and long-term horizons. In the near term, Iran might suspend cooperation with IAEA fully and withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and may use its enriched uranium toward a weapons capability. 

Even if the U.S. and Israel were to renew strikes on nuclear or military sites, halting the program could require multiple operations—none of which guarantee success—and Tehran’s response would be difficult to predict. It also remains unclear how far Washington would go in supporting further Israeli action. At the same time, the U.S. appears wary of triggering a full-scale war on Iran that could disrupt trade and economic stability. 
Iran has in recent years already started to shift more towards the East and the global south. By late 2023, Iran had graduated from observer to full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—gaining shared security drills, intelligence-sharing and regional trade initiatives—and it also joined BRICS, which can open the door to alternative financial networks. 

In March 2021, Iran and China locked in a long-term strategic partnership that ties Chinese investment in Iran’s energy, infrastructure and technology sectors to a steady, discounted flow of Iranian oil and includes joint ventures and national-currency trade arrangements designed to sidestep sanctions. 
Iran’s case with Russia is no different and this partnership is driven by systemic pressures—both nations face Western sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and military threats. Their alignment reflects a broader rejection of the U.S. led international order and a desire to shape a new multi-polar global system.

On January 17, 2025, Iran and Russia signed the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement in Moscow which outlines a 20-year framework for bilateral cooperation. The treaty is diverse and includes collaboration in Defense and Security, Energy and Infrastructure, Finance and Trade, Technology and Cyber security and etc. The treaty formalizes regular joint exercises, including naval operations in the Caspian Sea and counterterrorism drills in border regions. Russia has expanded its military exports to Iran, including drones, air defense systems, and electronic warfare tools. 
Both nations now coordinate on regional threats, particularly in Syria, Iraq, and the Caucasus.

However, the long-term strategic agreement between Iran and Russia does not include a mutual defense clause akin to NATO’s Article 5, unlike the pact recently signed between Russia and North Korea. Increased Western pressure on Iran and perceived threats to its survival could compel Tehran to deepen its cooperation with Russia. This might involve deploying troops—similar to North Korea’s support—to assist Russia in the conflict in Ukraine. However, Iran currently appears hopeful about reaching a diplomatic agreement with European countries and is cautious not to jeopardize those prospects. 

The shift is not limited to Iran, Qatar has long cultivated a reputation as a neutral mediator in West Asia conflicts, hosting U.S. Central Command’s Al Udeid Air Base and serving as the primary channel for Israel–Hamas ceasefire talks. Its balancing act has depended on Washington’s security umbrella—one that Doha assumed would deter any direct attack on its soil. On September 9, 2025, however, an Israeli strike on a Hamas delegation meeting in Doha shattered that assumption. 

At a press conference the next day, Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani condemned the operation as “state terrorism,” warning that “the strike has broken something in Qatar’s sense of security” and undermined its ability to mediate peace. He made clear that Doha can no longer take U.S. protection for granted. In response, Qatar has signaled plans to diversify its strategic partnerships. Officials are exploring deeper defense ties with Turkey and China. 

Doha is also negotiating new security pacts within the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council. These moves reflect a broader trend toward hedging—engaging multiple external powers to reduce dependence on any single guarantor of security in West Asia.